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authorGravatar Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>2019-02-09 17:19:53 +0100
committerGravatar Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>2019-02-10 10:50:36 +0100
commite2726ecaa613e108fbf44ded4bfb095304c14950 (patch)
tree13db3cba053cdaca1aefc4fafb6ab4c542809188
parente4789770712ff88cf36ae6b97741d9a006e47d3c (diff)
downloadbuildroot-e2726ecaa613e108fbf44ded4bfb095304c14950.tar.gz
buildroot-e2726ecaa613e108fbf44ded4bfb095304c14950.tar.bz2
package/libopenssl: add runtime fixes for tor
For details see https://bugs.archlinux.org/task/61623 Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
-rw-r--r--package/libopenssl/0005-Revert-Reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch62
-rw-r--r--package/libopenssl/0006-Fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch426
2 files changed, 488 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/package/libopenssl/0005-Revert-Reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch b/package/libopenssl/0005-Revert-Reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..104fa476a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libopenssl/0005-Revert-Reduce-stack-usage-in-tls13_hkdf_expand.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 56e0f123dc17cb99f50efbae4bbbab77f360818f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 18:14:57 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Reduce stack usage in tls13_hkdf_expand"
+
+This reverts commit ec0c5f5693e39c5a013f81e6dd9dfd09ec65162d.
+
+SSL_export_keying_material() may use longer label lengths.
+
+Fixes #7712
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
+
+(cherry picked from commit ed371b8cbac0d0349667558c061c1ae380cf75eb)
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+---
+ ssl/tls13_enc.c | 16 ++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index b6825d20c2..f7ab0fa470 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -13,14 +13,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+-/*
+- * RFC 8446, 7.1 Key Schedule, says:
+- * Note: With common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters
+- * requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute.
+- * The labels in this specification have all been chosen to fit within
+- * this limit.
+- */
+-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 12
++#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
+
+ /* Always filled with zeros */
+ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+@@ -36,15 +29,14 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+ {
+- static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
++ const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+ int ret;
+ size_t hkdflabellen;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ /*
+- * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
+- * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
+- * + bytes for the hash itself
++ * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
++ * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
+ */
+ unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+ + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/package/libopenssl/0006-Fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch b/package/libopenssl/0006-Fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..242ec7a8cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libopenssl/0006-Fix-some-SSL_export_keying_material-issues.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+From db860ea3dcf56a1993c66da22bd44460d7ac4914 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 08:37:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix some SSL_export_keying_material() issues
+
+Fix some issues in tls13_hkdf_expand() which impact the above function
+for TLSv1.3. In particular test that we can use the maximum label length
+in TLSv1.3.
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7755)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0fb2815b873304d145ed00283454fc9f3bd35e6b)
+Signed-off-by: Bernd Kuhls <bernd.kuhls@t-online.de>
+---
+ doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod | 3 +-
+ ssl/ssl_locl.h | 2 +-
+ ssl/statem/extensions.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c | 2 +-
+ ssl/tls13_enc.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++--------
+ test/sslapitest.c | 48 ++++++++++++----
+ test/tls13secretstest.c | 2 +-
+ 8 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+index abebf911fc..4c81a60ffb 100644
+--- a/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
++++ b/doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ B<label> and should be B<llen> bytes long. Typically this will be a value from
+ the IANA Exporter Label Registry
+ (L<https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#exporter-labels>).
+ Alternatively labels beginning with "EXPERIMENTAL" are permitted by the standard
+-to be used without registration.
++to be used without registration. TLSv1.3 imposes a maximum label length of
++249 bytes.
+
+ Note that this function is only defined for TLSv1.0 and above, and DTLSv1.0 and
+ above. Attempting to use it in SSLv3 will result in an error.
+diff --git a/ssl/ssl_locl.h b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+index 70e5a1740f..307131de93 100644
+--- a/ssl/ssl_locl.h
++++ b/ssl/ssl_locl.h
+@@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ __owur int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen);
++ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal);
+ __owur int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen);
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+index 63e61c6184..716d6d23e0 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/extensions.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
+
+ /* Generate the binder key */
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, early_secret, label, labelsize, hash,
+- hashsize, binderkey, hashsize)) {
++ hashsize, binderkey, hashsize, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+index 5a8f1163df..a0e495d8e8 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+@@ -2740,7 +2740,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+ PACKET_data(&nonce),
+ PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
+ s->session->master_key,
+- hashlen)) {
++ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+index e7c11c4bea..a8e862ced5 100644
+--- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+@@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+ tick_nonce,
+ TICKET_NONCE_SIZE,
+ s->session->master_key,
+- hashlen)) {
++ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+index f7ab0fa470..c3021d18aa 100644
+--- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c
++++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/kdf.h>
+
+-#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
++#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
+
+ /* Always filled with zeros */
+ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+@@ -22,30 +22,47 @@ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
+ * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
+ * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
+- * The |data| value may be zero length. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
++ * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
++ * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
+ */
+ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
++ unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
+ {
+- const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
++ static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL);
+ int ret;
+ size_t hkdflabellen;
+ size_t hashlen;
+ /*
+- * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
+- * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
++ * 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
++ * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
++ * + bytes for the hash itself
+ */
+ unsigned char hkdflabel[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
+ + sizeof(label_prefix) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
+- + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ + 1 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ WPACKET pkt;
+
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
++ if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
++ if (fatal) {
++ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
++ * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
++ */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
++ }
++ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
+@@ -59,8 +76,11 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ if (fatal)
++ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ else
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -74,9 +94,13 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+- if (ret != 0)
+- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
+- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ if (ret != 0) {
++ if (fatal)
++ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND,
++ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ else
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ }
+
+ return ret == 0;
+ }
+@@ -91,7 +115,7 @@ int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
+
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
+- NULL, 0, key, keylen);
++ NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -104,7 +128,7 @@ int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
+ static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
+
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
+- NULL, 0, iv, ivlen);
++ NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
+ }
+
+ int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+@@ -114,7 +138,7 @@ int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
+
+ return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
+- sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen);
++ sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -177,7 +201,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret,
+ (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
+ sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen,
+- preextractsec, mdlen)) {
++ preextractsec, mdlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return 0;
+@@ -337,7 +361,7 @@ static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
+ hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
+- secret, hashlen)) {
++ secret, hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+@@ -517,7 +541,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ early_exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hashval, hashlen,
+- s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
++ s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
++ 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+@@ -604,7 +629,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ resumption_master_secret,
+ sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
+ hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
+- hashlen)) {
++ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+@@ -624,7 +649,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
+ exporter_master_secret,
+ sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
+ hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
+- hashlen)) {
++ hashlen, 1)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ goto err;
+ }
+@@ -738,10 +763,10 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+- data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize)
++ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+- out, olen))
++ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+@@ -797,10 +822,10 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
+ (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
+- data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize)
++ data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
+ || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
+ sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
+- out, olen))
++ out, olen, 0))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+diff --git a/test/sslapitest.c b/test/sslapitest.c
+index 108d57e478..a4bbb4fead 100644
+--- a/test/sslapitest.c
++++ b/test/sslapitest.c
+@@ -4028,20 +4028,25 @@ static int test_serverinfo(int tst)
+ * no test vectors so all we do is test that both sides of the communication
+ * produce the same results for different protocol versions.
+ */
++#define SMALL_LABEL_LEN 10
++#define LONG_LABEL_LEN 249
+ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+ {
+ int testresult = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *sctx2 = NULL;
+ SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
+- const char label[] = "test label";
++ const char label[LONG_LABEL_LEN + 1] = "test label";
+ const unsigned char context[] = "context";
+ const unsigned char *emptycontext = NULL;
+ unsigned char ckeymat1[80], ckeymat2[80], ckeymat3[80];
+ unsigned char skeymat1[80], skeymat2[80], skeymat3[80];
++ size_t labellen;
+ const int protocols[] = {
+ TLS1_VERSION,
+ TLS1_1_VERSION,
+ TLS1_2_VERSION,
++ TLS1_3_VERSION,
++ TLS1_3_VERSION,
+ TLS1_3_VERSION
+ };
+
+@@ -4058,7 +4063,7 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+- if (tst == 3)
++ if (tst >= 3)
+ return 1;
+ #endif
+ if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(), TLS_client_method(),
+@@ -4076,33 +4081,52 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+ SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
+ goto end;
+
++ if (tst == 5) {
++ /*
++ * TLSv1.3 imposes a maximum label len of 249 bytes. Check we fail if we
++ * go over that.
++ */
++ if (!TEST_int_le(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat1,
++ sizeof(ckeymat1), label,
++ LONG_LABEL_LEN + 1, context,
++ sizeof(context) - 1, 1), 0))
++ goto end;
++
++ testresult = 1;
++ goto end;
++ } else if (tst == 4) {
++ labellen = LONG_LABEL_LEN;
++ } else {
++ labellen = SMALL_LABEL_LEN;
++ }
++
+ if (!TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat1,
+ sizeof(ckeymat1), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1, context,
++ labellen, context,
+ sizeof(context) - 1, 1), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat2,
+ sizeof(ckeymat2), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1,
++ labellen,
+ emptycontext,
+ 0, 1), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(clientssl, ckeymat3,
+ sizeof(ckeymat3), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1,
++ labellen,
+ NULL, 0, 0), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat1,
+ sizeof(skeymat1), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1,
++ labellen,
+ context,
+ sizeof(context) -1, 1),
+ 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat2,
+ sizeof(skeymat2), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1,
++ labellen,
+ emptycontext,
+ 0, 1), 1)
+ || !TEST_int_eq(SSL_export_keying_material(serverssl, skeymat3,
+ sizeof(skeymat3), label,
+- sizeof(label) - 1,
++ labellen,
+ NULL, 0, 0), 1)
+ /*
+ * Check that both sides created the same key material with the
+@@ -4131,10 +4155,10 @@ static int test_export_key_mat(int tst)
+ * Check that an empty context and no context produce different results in
+ * protocols less than TLSv1.3. In TLSv1.3 they should be the same.
+ */
+- if ((tst != 3 && !TEST_mem_ne(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
++ if ((tst < 3 && !TEST_mem_ne(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
+ sizeof(ckeymat3)))
+- || (tst ==3 && !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
+- sizeof(ckeymat3))))
++ || (tst >= 3 && !TEST_mem_eq(ckeymat2, sizeof(ckeymat2), ckeymat3,
++ sizeof(ckeymat3))))
+ goto end;
+
+ testresult = 1;
+@@ -5909,7 +5933,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_custom_exts, 3);
+ #endif
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_serverinfo, 8);
+- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat, 4);
++ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat, 6);
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_export_key_mat_early, 3);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/test/tls13secretstest.c b/test/tls13secretstest.c
+index 724c170c56..66a0582887 100644
+--- a/test/tls13secretstest.c
++++ b/test/tls13secretstest.c
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static int test_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *prk,
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prk, label, labellen, hash, hashsize,
+- gensecret, hashsize)) {
++ gensecret, hashsize, 1)) {
+ TEST_error("Secret generation failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+--
+2.20.1
+